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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
yet the Court made no reference to the law of easements.
Thus it is sometimes stated that the right of drainage of
surface waters is based on the law of natural easements,
but the term "natural right" is apt to create less confusion
in its usage than the term "natural easement".
STILL FURTHER ON WHETHER A SPENDTHRIFT
TRUST MAY BE REACHED FOR ALIMONY
OR SUPPORT
Hitchins v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.
of Baltimore'
This was a dual action, one part of which was a proceed-
ing filed by a surviving trustee in the Circuit Court of
Baltimore City, praying a construction of the will of a cer-
tain testator. By that will the testator created a trust, con-
taining spendthrift provisions as to both corpus and income,
for the benefit of certain designated life tenants. The will
then directed that upon the death of the surviving life
tenant, the trustee should pay the net income to those
grandchildren who were in being at the time of the testa-
tor's death, in equal shares, until such time as the youngest
eligible grandchild should reach the age of twenty-one
years, at which time the trust should terminate and the
property and effects constituting the corpus be sold, the
proceeds therefrom to be divided among the grandchildren
entitled to take under the will. Surviving the testator at
his death, were the designated life tenants and four grand-
children. The appellant, wife of one of the grandchildren
entitled to share under the will, entered into a separation
agreement with him in 1928, whereby he agreed to pay to
her as "permanent alimony" a certain sum, until such time
as the estate of his grandfather should be finally settled
and distributed, at which time he would pay over to her
one-third of the amount distributed to him by the trustee,
upon receipt of which the "permanent alimony" should
cease. Subsequently, the appellant secured a divorce in a
foreign forum. Upon the death of the surviving life tenant,
in 1947, all of the eligible grandchildren were over twenty-
one years of age.
In one proceeding, February 1948, the appellant issued
in the Superior Court of Baltimore City a non-resident
attachment, to which the separation agreement was at-
1 6 A. 2d 93, 97 (Md. 1949).
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tached as voucher, and levied upon "all the right, title and
interest" of her former spouse in the undistributed corpus
of the trust, which corpus consisted of two fee simple lots
of ground in Baltimore City. The appellee, as surviving
trustee, met this by filing claim to the attached property,
and a plea of property therein. A hearing before the Court,
sitting without jury, resulted in a verdict and judgment in
favor of the appellee.
The above referred to bill for construction filed by the
trustee in the Circuit Court produced two decrees, one
authorizing a sale of the property without prejudice to the
rights of the parties, and the other disallowing the appel-
lant's claim due to the spendthrift provisions of the trust.
From the judgment at law and the decrees in Equity, the
appellant prosecuted twin appeals.
In affirming the lower court in both cases,2 the Court of
Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Henderson, disposed of
the spendthrift problem by stating: "The appellant's claim
is not based upon a lien or judgment but merely upon an
agreement to pay certain sums as 'permanent alimony', and
to pay one-third of the amount distributed to him after
settlement of the estate.... The appellees contend that such
a claim cannot be recognized until reduced to judgment....
In any event, we think the claim is barred by the spend-
thrift provisions.... The appellant is only a contract credi-
tor and has not brought herself within the exception as to
alimony laid down in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore
v. Robertson."'
The instant decision presents an apparent qualification
of the position recently taken by the Court of Appeals in
the Robertson case. In the earlier case, the question pre-
sented was as to the right of the divorced wife of a spend-
thrift cestui que trust to reach the income from the trust
when suing on the basis of ajudgment for alimony arrear-
ages. In a forceful opinion, also by Judge Henderson, the
Court of Appeals there held: "We think the rule that gives
legal effect to spendthrift provisions as against contract
creditors should not be extended to claims for support or
alimony."4 The Court quoted at length from Scott On
2 The Court of Appeals, in the first case, held that the trust did not termi-
nate upon the death of the surviving life tenant, since the trustee was
directed to then sell and divide the proceeds among the grandchildren en-
titled, which duty on the trustee was essential to the complete fulfillment of
the trust provisions; and that the testator's direction to sell and distribute
the proceeds worked an equitable conversion, the only interest of the re-
mainderman being to receive distribution of the proceeds of sale. Ibid, p. 93.
8 Supra, n. 1, 99.
'65 A. 2d 292, 296 (Md. 1949).
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Trusts, where it is said: "The claim of a wife and dependent
children to support is based upon the clearest grounds of
public policy. They are in quite a different position from
ordinary creditors who have voluntarily extended credit.
It would be shocking indeed to permit a husband to receive
and enjoy the whole of the income from a large trust fund
and to make no provision for his needy dependents."5 The
Court further quoted and followed the Restatement of
Trusts, Section 157, which provides:
"Particular Classes of Claimants. Although a trust
is a spendthrift trust or a trust for support, the interest
of the beneficiary can be reached in satisfaction of an
enforceable claim against the beneficiary,
(a) by the wife or child of the beneficiary for support,
or by the wife for alimony;
(b) for necessary services rendered to the beneficiary
or necessary supplies furnished to him;
(c) for services rendered and materials furnished
which preserve, or benefit the interest of the bene-
ficiary."'6
The Court of Appeals then concluded its basic reasoning
by stating that: "In such situations the wife is a favored
suitor, and her claim is based upon the strongest grounds
of public policy .... We rest our decision upon grounds of
public policy, not upon any interpretation of the instru-
ments in question, which are not broad enough to authorize
payments by the trustee for the benefit of a divorced wife."7
Thus, in this case, the Maryland Court recognized that such
classes of claimants - wives, children, and creditors who
have furnished necessaries to the spendthrift beneficiary-
are persons holding peculiarly strong equities, which equi-
ties that Court would not allow to be defeated by the
general rules supporting spendthrift trusts. In Fetting v.
5 ScoTT, TRUSTS (1939) Sec. 157.1, 790.
ORErATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935). The 1948 Supplement to the Restatement
adds the following to the headnote of Section 157: "(d) by the United States
or a State or subdivision thereof to satisfy a claim against the beneficiary."
See, as authority for this, United States v. Dallas National Bank, 152 F. 2d
582 (C.C.C. 5th, 1945), rev'g., 56 F. Supp. 181 (D.C.N.D. Tex., 1944) ; Mer-
cantile Trust Co. v. Hofferbert, 58 F. Supp. 701 (D.C.D. Md., 1944) (quoting
RESTATEMENT, Section 157); United States v. Mercantile Trust Co., 62 F.
Supp. 837 (D.C.D. Md., 1945) ; Matter of Rosenberg, 199 N.E. 206, 269 N.Y.
247, 105 A.L.R. 1238 (1935), cert. den. sub. nom. Rosenberg v. United States,
298 U.S. 669 (1935); State v. Caldwell, 181 Tenn. 74, 178 S.W. 2d 624, 151
A.L.R. 1410 (1944); Re Harris (1945) Chan. 316.
Supra, n. 4, 296.
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Flanagan,' the Court of Appeals had already recognized that
the trustee's right to reimbursement for taxes paid on the
estate was within this special class of claims, quoting and
relying on the Restatement, Section 157, comment "d".
Commenting upon the Robertson decision, this REVIEW
pointed out that: "The result of the decision in the instant
case is to place Maryland, under a strongly written opinion,
squarely in line with the growing number of jurisdictions
which hold that the income from spendthrift trusts may
be reached by the wife for alimony. And the language
of the opinion, as quoted above, relates to claims for sup-
port as well as for alimony. This is sound because spend-
thrift trusts, which required special favor of the law to
be enforceable at all, should not have that favor extended
to defeat the social policy of the State that a husband
must support his wife and children."9 As a result of the
Robertson decision, it was hoped that when the question
as to the right of a support (as distinguished from technical
alimony) claimant came before it, the Maryland Court
would determine the outcome not by a technical distinc-
tion as to what is and what is not "alimony", but upon the
fundamental basis of public policy, and recognize that any
suit, the true nature of which is a proceeding for support
or maintenance, should prevail against the provisions of
a spendthrift trust. It was expected that the erroneous
implication of the Bauernschmidt case, discussed infra, had
been destroyed by the breadth and strength of the Robert-
son opinion. The Hitchins decision disappoints that ex-
pectation.
In that portion of its argument in the instant controversy
relative to the spendthrift issue, the appellee relied upon
the cases of Dickey v. Dickey, ° Bushman v. Bushman," and
Bauernschmidt v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore."2
The Dickey and Bushman cases are well-known authori-
ties for the proposition that, in Maryland, money decrees
founded upon agreements for support are not alimony
8185 Md. 499, 45 A. 2d 355, 174 A.L.R. 301 (1946), quoting Scorr and the
RESTATEMENT, Section 157, Comment d.
I Note, Further on Whether a Spendthrift Trust May Be Reached for
Alimony or Support, 10 Maryland Law Review 359 (1950).
10154 Md. 675, 141 A. 387, 58 A.L.R. 634 (1928).
"157 Md. 166, 145 A. 488 (1929).
"176 Md. 351, 4 A. 2d 712 (1939), noted May a Spendthrift Interest be
Reached for Alinwny or Support, 4 Maryland Law Review 417 (1940), where
the rationale of the decision was questioned, it being pointed out that public
policy clearly required that the wife's right to reach a spendthrift interest
for support should not depend upon the reduction of her claim to technical
alimony. See the appellate briefs submitted in the instant controversy.
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decrees, but rather ordinary debts of record in relation to
the constitutional limitation in respect to imprisonment for
debt. The Bauernschmidt case applied these decisions, be-
yond their original holdings,"3 as a bar to an attempt to
reach a spendthrift interest in Maryland for a claim based
on a California decree for separate maintenance pursuant
to an agreement between the parties. In thus applying
the rule of these earlier cases, the Court of Appeals held
that the wife's claim stood upon no higher footing than that
of any other creditor.
As a result, a query must be raised as to just what
types of claims in Maryland may be properly denominated
"claims for support or alimony" within the language of
the Robertson case so as to enable the wife to reach her
husband's spendthrift interest. Little help would be de-
rived from an attempt to analogize the problem to the
Maryland alimony law, since the alimony decisions labor
under the burden of fine distinctions, as, e.g., distinctions
for purposes of imprisonment for contempt," and for pur-
poses of modification of decrees. 5 There can be little doubt
but that a court order for the support of dependent chil-
dren and/or an equitable award of support, whether as
"alimony" or otherwise, should under the Robertson case
be enforceable against the income from a spendthrift trust,
irrespective of whether such awards could be enforced by
contempt proceedings. A similar result should be obtained
when the wife is attempting to enforce a support agree-
ment, or a decree based thereon, because the same social
policy is present, viz., the insistence of the State that the
husband support his wife. That is, irrespective of whether
the claim brought against the spendthrift trust is an ali-
mony judgment, a judicial order of support, a support
agreement, or a decree based upon a support agreement,
the social policy that a husband maintain his wife is equally
present. It is somewhere short of logical to strongly adopt
the rule of the Robertson case that a wife proceeding against
a spendthrift trust on the basis of an alimony judgment
may, due to the over-riding pressure of public policy, suc-
ceed in her suit, whereas if her suit is based upon a support
agreement it must fail. Yet that is, apparently, the com-
bined result of the Robertson and Hitchins decisions. This
result can only be achieved by ignoring in the Hitchins
SIbid.
11 Dickey v. Dickey, 8upra, n. 10, Bushman v. Bushman, supra, n. 11.
5Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584 (1913) ; Marshall v. Marshall, 162 Md.
116, 159 A. 260, 83 A.L.R. 1237 (1931) ; Marshall v. Marshall, 164 Md. 107,
163 A. 874 (1932).
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case the one element which it is submitted is common to
both situations - the long established moral and legal
obligation of a husband to provide for his wife, and which
in policy outweighs the policy of generally sustaining
spendthrift provisions.
The reasoning in a New York case, In Re Yard's Estate,"6
is apposite. There, a wife was permitted to enforce the
provisions of a separation and support agreement against
the income from a certain trust, against the objections of
the husband who contended that the support agreement
was an assignment, and therefore void, under the New
York statutes which prohibited the transfer of trust income.
In allowing the wife's suit, the Court said, in part, that:
"I see no difference between the direction in a decree of
alimony and the amount allowed in the separation agree-
ment. In the former case there is an element of compulsion,
although within the proper jurisdiction of a court of equity.
In the latter case the husband consents to the allowance,
thereby recognizing the duty to provide and the reason-
ableness of the amount fixed by both parties. Indeed, under
all the authorities, the terms of a valid separation agree-
ment seem to be equally as forceful and effectual as a
judicial allowance of alimony .... Such a contract is bind-
ing upon both parties, unless set aside or impeached....
This court cannot allow the husband to repudiate a written
contract directing payment of his trust income for the sup-
port of his wife."
An argument which may be raised in support of the
result of the Hitchins case is that if support agreements,
lacking as they do judicial surveillance in their inception,
may be used as a basis for reaching a spendthrift trust, the
interest of the beneficiary may be subjected to unduly
large or excessive claims. This fear should be obviated by
the fact that support money could be obtained from the
spendthrift interest only by proceeding in equity against
the trustee, and should naturally be allowed only when, in
the sound discretion of the equity court, the amount called
for in the support agreement is reasonable. This would
follow automatically when such agreement has been ap-
proved by formal decree, and the decree becomes the basis
of the claim; but the problem should not be an insurmounta-
ble one when suit is directly on the original agreement.
Professor Scott has suggested as an intermediate view for
permitting the spendthrift interest to be reached that: "It
may be held that the dependents of the beneficiary cannot
16116 Misc. 19, 189 N.Y.S. 190, 193 (1921).
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be precluded from reaching his interest under a spend-
thrift trust, but that they can reach only so much of the
income as under the circumstances may appear reasonable
to the court which has control over the administration
of the trust .... Under ... this view the beneficiary is not
permitted to live in luxury while his dependents starve.
On the other hand, they will not be permitted to live in
comfort while he starves.' 1 7 While the Court of Appeals
found no necessity for such an analysis to support its
result in the Robertson case,' s it is submitted that the
analysis could be a very appropriate one with which to
handle the situation presented by the Hitchins case. Such
flexibility of equity's action is demonstrated by those cases
which allow a reasonable recovery to persons who have
supplied necessaries or rendered essential services to the
spendthrift beneficiary, or who have improved or preserved
the trust property. 9 Also, equity courts regularly take the
similiar action of adjusting the provisions of alimony de-
crees as changing circumstances may require. Unless the
law is now to regard private separation and support agree-
ments with disfavor, which has not been the case in the
past, the Hitchins result has little or no justification.
27 SCOTT, op. cit. supra, n. 5, p. 791 et seq.
Supra, n. 4, 296.
19 See, e.g., Alvis v. Bank of America National Trust and Savings Ass'n.,
212 P. 2d 608 (Cal. App., 1949) ; Matter of Williams, 187 N.Y. 286, 79 N.E.
1019 (1907), rev'g. (mem.), Matter of Bischoff, 114 App. Div. 904, 100
N.Y.S. 1105 (1906) (attorney); Rosenthal v. Lawyer's County Trust Co.,
156 Misc. 910, 282 N.Y.S. 868 (1935) (attorney) ; Sherman v. Skuse, 166
N.Y. 345, 59 N.E. 990 (1901), aff'g., 45 App. Div. 335, 60 N.Y.S. 1030 (1898)
(physician) ; Matter of Berrien, 147 Misc. 788, 264 N.Y.S. 593 (1933)
(physician and hospital allowed recovery) ; Cooper v. Carter, 145 Mo. App.
387, 129 S.W. 224 (1910); and note Pole v. Pietsch, 61 Md. 570 (1884),
allowing recovery by physician against discretionary trust for support; ci.
Levi. v. Bergman, 94 Md. 204, 50 A. 515 (1901) ; Matter of Frayer, 155 Misc.
811, 280 N.Y.S. 657 (1935) ; note also such cases as In Re Cooke's Estate,
181 Misc. 748, 47 N.Y.S. 2d 844 (1944), allowing suit against trust by State
institution for reimbursement of expenses incurred in supporting an in-
competent beneficiary; Estate of Surbeck, 56 N.Y.S. 2d 487 (1945) ; Matter
of Emmons, 59 N.Y.S. 2d 264 (1946) ; such New York cases proceed under
the authority of Section 24-a of the Mental Hygiene Law (Section 40 giving
the State a preferred status in such cases) ; see also, Sections 792 and 793,
N.Y. Civil Practice Act, and N.Y. Laws, 1941, ch. 694, giving to equity courts
general power to make such orders with respect to trust income as may be
proper under the circumstances; see Ryan v. Edgerton, 177 Misc. 421, 30
N.Y.S. 2d 941 (1941), applying these statutes; for a full study of the N.Y.
statutory law relative to this problem see Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts
(2nd ed. 1947) ; see also Department of Public Welfare v. Meek, 264 Ky.
771, 95 S.W. 2d 599 (1936) ; Walters' Case, 278 Pa. 421, 123 A. 408 (1924) ;
Cronin's Case, 326 Pa. 343, 192 A. 397 (1937) ; Town of Shrewsbury v.
Bucklin, 105 Vt. 188, 163 A. 626, 86 A.L.R. 133 (1933), noted, Spendthrift
Trusts - Claim of Town For Costs of Maintaining Beneficiary In Jail, 81
U'. of Pa. L. Rev. 1009 (1933); Bradshaw v. American Advent Christian
Home, 145 Fla. 270, 199 So. 329 (1940).
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Desirable as might be the result of allowing all claims
for support or alimony, to the extent to which equity deems
them reasonable, to reach the spendthrift interest, the
Hitchins case eliminates one possible claim (the support
agreement) and suggests elimination of another (the sup-
port agreement reduced to judgment.) Policy-wise, it would
seem desirable for the Court to at least avoid striking
down the latter, by distinguishing the Dickey, Bushman,
and Bauernschmidt cases as being limited to their par-
ticular facts, and thus permit a spendthrift interest to be
reached by any support agreement which has been reduced
to a Maryland decree or judgment. But full accord with
the view of the Restatement (approved in the Robertson
case), which would seem to protect the wife in any valid
reasonable claim for support can only be secured by a
reversal of the Hitchins and Bauernschmidt rulings, or by
legislative enactment. The matter is controlled by statute
in a number of jurisdictions.21
2 See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. (1939), Sec. 570; La. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Dart,
1939), Sec. 9850.28; Okla. Stat. (1943 Supp.), Tit. 60, Sec. 175.25; 20 Pa.
S. 301.12; N.Y. Real Prop. Law, See. 98, and N.Y. Civil Practice Act, 8upra,
n. 19; cf. Ky. Rev. Stat. (1942), Sec. 381.180. The Louisiana and Oklahoma
statutes are based in part on the spendthrift statute proposed by Griswold,
op. cit. 8upra, n. 19, Sec. 565. Also, consider the effect of the adoption in
Maryland of the Uniform Support of Dependents Law, Md. Laws 1950, Ch.
13, and of the proposed constitutional amendment in Md. Laws 1950, Ch. 14,
which, if adopted, alters the doctrine of the Bushman, Dickey, and Bauern-
schmidt cases, supra circa Nos. 12, 13, and 14. Cf. Knight v. Knight (Circuit
Court No. 2 of Baltimore City, Opinion by Niles, J., reported in The Daily
Record, April 14, 1950), enforcing by contempt proceedings a foreign decree
for alimony.
1950]
